("And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.")
Read the whole chapter. While he disagrees with Hobbes, who felt that men without government were always in a state of war, he still allows that when there is a "declared design of force" and no "common superior on earth to appeal to for relief" that in such a situation a state of war exists and one is entitled to kill even a thief for taking one's coat.
See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality. Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens . . . .")
Enlightenment philosophy was quite thoroughly criticized by postmodernist thinkers like Foucault who showed that enlightenment was used as a tool and enabler of oppression. Your statements support that criticism.
Moreover, I am not convinced that quoting Locke, Hobbes and US judicial precedent provides enough proof that "every nation" has a "right" to "kill people in other countries". Enlightenment philosophy is not an ultimate argument, you know.
Personally, I think this viewpoint is morally bankrupt and no government employing this "right" should be supported by its citizens.
I find arguing about "right" and "wrong" in the abstract to be a boring exercise, because that just comes down to feelings and emotion. It's no fun to argue when there's no agreed-upon set of rules to argue within!
Here, I'm not arguing that my viewpoint is "right" or "wrong" or that Locke is "good" or "bad." I'm arguing that it's consistent with the philosophical underpinnings of the Anglo-American legal and political system. Like it or not, Enlightenment thinking and Lockean philosophy in particular are an important reference point when evaluating questions about America's political system.
("And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.")
Read the whole chapter. While he disagrees with Hobbes, who felt that men without government were always in a state of war, he still allows that when there is a "declared design of force" and no "common superior on earth to appeal to for relief" that in such a situation a state of war exists and one is entitled to kill even a thief for taking one's coat.
See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality. Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens . . . .")